State v. Lemmons Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 43720 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
10-18-2016
State v. Lemmons Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt.
43720
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Lemmons Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 43720" (2016). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 6145.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6145
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO















S.Ct. Nos. 43720 and 43721
(consolidated)
Twin Falls Co. CR-2011-14836
and CR-2012-10131
__________________________________
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
__________________________________
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho
In and For the County of Twin Falls
__________________________________
HONORABLE RANDY J. STOKER,
District Judge
__________________________________
Dennis Benjamin Lawrence Wasden
ISBA# 4199 ATTORNEY GENERAL
NEVIN, BENJAMIN McKAY STATE OF IDAHO
& BARTLETT LLP Kenneth K. Jorgensen
303 West Bannock Deputy Attorney General
P.O. Box 2772 Criminal Law Division
Boise, ID  83701 P.O. Box 83720
(208) 343-1000 Boise, ID 83720-0010
db@nbmlaw.com (208) 334-2400
Attorneys for Appellant Attorneys for Respondent
i 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
  
I. Table of Authorities  ........................................................................................... ii 
 
II. Argument In Reply ............................................................................................. 1 
 
III. Conclusion  ........................................................................................................ 2 
ii 
I. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  
 
STATE CASES  
 
Ex parte Bell, 34 Okla. Crim. 354, 246 P. 893 (1926) ................................................... 1 
 
Blondes v. State, 19 Md. App. 714, 314 A.2d 746 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 273 
Md. 435, 330 A.2d 169 (1975) ............................................................................. 2 
 
Hernandez v. State, 691 P.2d 287 (Alaska Ct. App.1984) ............................................ 2 
 
Olevsky v. District of Columbia, 548 A.2d 78 (D.C.1988) ............................................. 2 
 
Peed v. Brewster, 168 Ind. 51, 79 N.E. 1039 (1907) ...................................................... 2 
 
State v. Crook, 248 S.W.3d 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) ............................................... 1 
 
State v. McDonagh, 232 Ariz. 247, 304 P.3d 212 (Ct. App. 2013) ................................ 1 
 
State v. Woodcock, 922 S.W.2d 904 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), citing, State v. Brown, 
616 So. 2d 792 (La. Ct. App.1993) ...................................................................... 2 
 
Trumbly v. State, —P.3d —, 2016 WL. 4608110 (Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2016) ...... 1 
  www.britannica.com/art/oxymoron1
1
II.  ARGUMENT IN REPLY
The state argues, without citation to authority, that “the concept of
concurrent fines is an ‘oxymoron.’”  State’s Brief, pg. 5.  It is incorrect because an
“oxymoron” is a figure of speech in which two opposite ideas are joined to create a
literary effect, e.g., “cruel kindness” or “living death.”   Ms. Lemmons does not use1
the phrase in that way.  Further, many states permit the concurrent imposition of
fines.  See, e.g., Trumbly v. State, — P.3d —, 2016 WL 4608110, at *3 (Alaska Ct.
App. Sept. 2, 2016) (“[W]e conclude that Alaska law does not prohibit the concurrent
imposition of mandatory minimum fines when a defendant is sentenced for both
driving under the influence and refusal.”); State v. Crook, 248 S.W.3d 172, 177 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2008) (“We decide that the concurrent sentences provision of [Texas
Penal Code] Section 3.03(a) applies to the entire sentence, including fines.”); State v.
McDonagh, 232 Ariz. 247, 251, 304 P.3d 212, 216 (Ct. App. 2013) (“‘[C]oncurrent’
Assessments can be effectuated by crediting each single dollar paid as a dollar
payment of the Assessments for each (as opposed to just one) count.”); Ex parte Bell,
34 Okla. Crim. 354, 246 P. 893, 895 (1926) (Where sentence on second conviction
runs concurrently with prior sentence, fine and costs in subsequent judgment and
sentence are discharged under prior sentence in same manner as imprisonment is
discharged.)  Likewise, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that concurrent fines
are discretionary under statute after collecting cases “which have expressed tacit
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approval for the concept of ‘concurrent fines.’”  State v. Woodcock, 922 S.W.2d 904,
917 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), citing, State v. Brown, 616 So.2d 792 (La. Ct.
App.1993); Olevsky v. District of Columbia, 548 A.2d 78 (D.C.1988); Hernandez v.
State, 691 P.2d 287 (Alaska Ct. App.1984); Blondes v. State, 19 Md. App. 714, 314
A.2d 746 (1974), rev’d on other grounds, 273 Md. 435, 330 A.2d 169 (1975).  See also,
Peed v. Brewster, 168 Ind. 51, 79 N.E. 1039 (1907) (Holding that sentences under
statute providing that any person imprisoned for failure to pay fines may be
imprisoned one day for every dollar of the fine may be served concurrently.) 
Consequently, the state’s unsupported contention that fines may not be served
concurrently is without merit.
III.  CONCLUSION  
For the reasons set forth above and in the Opening Brief, Ms. Lemmons
respectfully requests that the Court remand both the 2011 case (No. 436720) and
the 2012 case (No. 43721) with instructions that the district court exercise its
discretion and consider whether to run the fines concurrently.
Respectfully submitted this 18  day of October, 2016.th
 /s/Dennis Benjamin                     
Dennis Benjamin 
Attorney for Bryann Lemmons 
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